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IS COLLUSION-PROOF PROCUREMENT EXPENSIVE?∗
GAURAB ARYAL† AND MARIA F. GABRIELLI‡
ABSTRACT. Collusion among bidders adversely affects procurement cost
and in some cases efficiency, and it seems collusion is more prevalent that
we would like. Statistical methods of detecting collusion just using bid
data, in a hope to deter future collusion, is perilous, and access to addi-
tional data is rare and often always after the fact. In this paper, we estimate
the extra cost of implementing a new procurement rule proposed by Chen
and Micali [2012] that is robust to collusion and always guarantees the ef-
ficient outcome. The rule requires bidders to report their coalition and to
ensure incentive-compatibility, the mechanism allows them to attain rents.
We estimate this rent using data from California highway construction and
find it to be anywhere between 1.6% to 5%. Even after we factor in the mar-
ginal excess burden of taxes needed to finance these rents, the cost ranges
between 2.08% and 6.5%, suggesting that there is a room to think about
running this new auction, suggesting we should consider this auction.
Keywords: Collusion; Procurements; Collusion-Proof Auction; Local Poly-
nomial Estimator.
JEL: C1, C4, C7, D44, L4.
1. INTRODUCTION
Auction is a widely used method, to buy and sell goods and services, in
both private and government sectors. Some of these markets (timbers auc-
tions, highway constructions, off-shore wild cat auctions, etc.) have been
studied extensively in empirical auction; see Athey and Haile [2006] and the
references therein. Whether or not auction achieves its goal of maximum
revenue (or minimum cost) and efficiency, depends crucially on the com-
petition among bidders, Ausubel and Milgrom [2006]. It is, however, well
known that auction is susceptible to collusion, Marshall and Marx [2009],
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and therefore should be factored in while choosing auction rules. In some
cases, like the recent Libor scandal, the extent of the damages inflicted on
public by collusion has been very large and has also attracted attention from
press, see Taibbi [2012, 2013]. There are papers that have studied the ef-
fect of collusion on revenue or cost, some of them include Comanor and
Schankerman [1976]; Feinstein, Block, and Nold [1985]; Lang and Rosenthal
[1991]; Porter and Zona [1993]; Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard [1997]; Ba-
jari [2001]; Porter and Zona [1999]; Pesendorfer [2000]; Bajari and Ye [2003];
Marshall and Meurer [2004]; Asker [2008]; Harrington [2008]; Marshall and
Marx [2012]. Even though it is impossible to quantify the likelihood of col-
lusion, there seems to be an overwhelming evidence to suggest that the like-
lihood is non negligible. Therefore collusion should be of first-order impor-
tance in any empirical auction paper whose aim is to use the data to estimate
the parameters that can then be used to design optimal auctions.
One of the main difficulties when it comes to collusion is that collusive
rings tend to be secretive and sly, and detecting their presence from only
bids data is perilous, Aryal and Gabrielli [2013]. Moreover, it is rare for
researchers to get access to any other information pertaining to the cartel
like those in [see Porter and Zona, 1999; Asker, 2008; Conley and Decaro-
lis, forthcoming]. These are, however, ‘after-the-fact’ studies that do not
help the auctioneer to deter collusion. As seen with the Libor scandal, Hou
and Skeie [2013], even when the identity of the suspected colluders and the
damages are known, proving any wrongdoing is hard and often a drawn-
out and expensive process. This begs the question as to why don’t the auc-
tioneer use collusion-proof auction. Green and Laffont [1979]; Laffont and
Martimort [1997, 1998, 2000] have shown that it is very hard to find such
auction.
Keeping these difficulties in mind, in this paper we want to suggest that
we should use a new auction rule proposed by Chen and Micali [2012]
(henceforth, C-M). C-M propose a variation of Vickrey auction which re-
quires firms to report their coalition and to ensure incentive-compatibility,
the mechanism allows firms to attain rents. This modified Vickrey auction
is resilient to collusion, induces efficient allocation, in dominant strategies
while maintaining the ex post individual rationality for all parties. Using
3California highway procurements data, we estimate this rent to be any-
where between 1.6% to 5%. This is the price we have to pay to ensure effi-
ciency in auction even when bidders collude in an arbitrary way. Even if we
factor in the marginal excess burden of taxes needed to pay for these rents,
the increase in cost is between 2.08% and 6.5%.
To calculate the rent, we first use the data from California Highway pro-
curements to estimate the bidders’ cost. For that we estimate the bid dis-
tribution and bid density using the first step of Aryal, Gabrielli, and Vuong
[2015] who propose a
√
n− consistent semiparametric estimation method.
They propose using local polynomial estimation method (henceforth, LPE)
of Fan and Gijbels [1996], instead of the widely used kernel-smoothed den-
sity estimators, because unlike the kernel density estimator LPE estimators
are consistent even at the boundary and therefore do not require trimming.
Then following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] we use a first-price
procurmenet auction model with asymmetric bidders to identify and esti-
mate the cost parameter for each construction company. Since it is possible
that the data itself have collusive bidders, we have to control for that in our
estimation. For that we use the tests in Bajari and Ye [2003] to determine
a set of potential colluders by finding those whose bidding pattern depart
from competitive bidding. Then, using the estimated costs, in a counterfac-
tual exercise we implement C-M auction and calculate the change in total
cost. Out of 413 bidders, we flag 15 who fail one of the two competitive-
bidding (exchangeability and independence) tests. The worse case for Cal-
trans is if all of these bidders form one single bidding ring and hence we
treat all of these 15 bidders as members of one ring. We also recognize
that forming and maintaining a large bidding ring is difficult, so we explore
other ways to restrict the size of the ring. Using the idea that ring members
tend to bid simultaneously to provide cover bids, we find that only 4 out of
the above 15 fail the test.
Depending on whether there are only 4 or 15 bidders in a bidding ring, we
find that using the new auction will increase Caltran’s cost by respectively,
(approximately) $34 millions to $107 millions, i.e., 1.6% to 5% of the total
construction expenditure in our sample. If, however, we take into account
that to pay for the additional expenses the (state or federal) government
4 G. ARYAL AND M.F. GABRIELLI
would have to collect taxes, which leads to deadweight loss, the previous
numbers increase. While estimates of the deadweight loss due to taxes are
hard to come by, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley [1985] estimate the marginal
deadweight loss to be a sizable 0.3. This means if Caltrans were to imple-
ment the new auction it would increase the (social) cost by at least 2.08%
bounded above by 6.5%.
The main message of this paper is: a) collusion is bad for the economy, es-
pecially when it comes to public procurements; b) collusion seems to be very
prevalent, and even if we do not have a precise idea about how frequent it
is, partly because it depends on the nature of the product or services and
partly because most collusion goes undetected, casual observation suggests
that it is quite frequent and should be an important feature in optimal auc-
tion design; c) auctions that are robust to collusion are hard to design, Chen
and Micali [2012] is one such paper that proposes a new auction rule, but it
requires the auctioneer to provide some rent to the colluders to ensure that
they tell the truth about their membership in any collusive rings; e) we esti-
mate this extra cost (rent) required to run this new auction using data from
California highway construction and estimate it to be no more than 6.5%
and no less than 2.08%, after accounting for any distortion resulting from
higher taxes required to pay the rents, which seems to be reasonable. We
should not reject C-M auction outright just because the cost will increase by
6.5%, because the right comparison should be between the C-M auction and
losses due to collusion, that we cannot even estimate, and not between the
C-M auction and competitive bidding. If bidders bid competitively, C-M
auction would be the same as second-price auction.
Having said that, we understand the legal and philosophical difficulty
that might arise in giving rents to those who collude and committing to
never using this information in prosecution. Such a leniency program, how-
ever, is not without precedence. The Leniency Program run by the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice is one such example, and it is often
touted as one of the most important investigative tool to deal with cartel ac-
tivities.1 The program has been successful even outside the US; see Borrell,
Jime´nez, and Garcia [2013]. When faced with the possibility that bidders
1 See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.html.
5could collude without we ever knowing it, and with possibly unrestricted
and often unknown damages, it looks reasonable to say that if providing
some rent to potential colluders ensures that we always get efficient out-
come then may be we should. But to be able to shed light on how one can
extend these leniency program to include C-M auction needs further prob-
ing and research, and is left for future.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the models, identifi-
cation and estimation; Section 3 introduces C-M auction; Section 4 explains
the data; Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Choice of
bandwidths, tables and figure are in the Appendix A-1.
2. MODEL, IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In this section we consider a procurement auction, i.e. a low-price sealed
bid auction, with asymmetric (regular and fringe) bidders. The section is
divided into two subsections. The first subsection introduces the model and
identification, and the second subsection deals with estimation.
2.1. Model and Identification. For every auction ` = 1, 2, . . . , L, a single
and indivisible project is procured to N` ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders using first
price low bids mechanism. The essential characteristic of the project for
each auction is summarized by a random variable X` ∈ R+, which for us
will be the engineer’s estimate of the project. We assume that there are two
types of bidders, k = 0, 1, with nk` type k bidders in `−auction, such that
N` = n0` + n1`. In every auction ` a type k bidder draws his/her cost, i.i.d.
across all other bidders, from Fk(·|X`, N`). The set of observables W is
W :=
{
X`, n0`, n1`, {b0i}n0`i=1, {b1i}n1`i=1,
}
, ` = 1, 2, . . . L.
where bki is the bid by type k ∈ {0, 1} bidder i ∈ nk`. We assume that:
Assumption 1. (A1)
(1) Exogenous Participation: Fk(·|X, N) = Fk(·|X) for k = 0, 1.
(2) For each ` and each k ∈ {0, 1} the variables Cki`, i ∈ nk` ∼ iid Fk(·|·) with
density fk(·|·) conditional on X`.
(3) An auction ` has N` ∈ {n, n} risk-neutral bidders with n ≥ 2.
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(4) The three- dimensional vector (X`, n0`, n1`) ∼ iid Qm(·, ·, ·) with density
qm(·, ·, ·) for all ` = 1, 2, . . . L, where Q(·) is a product of absolutely con-
tinuous measure and a counting measure.
(5) The bids Bk ∼ iid Gk(·|X`, N`) with density gk(·|X`, N`) > 0, k ∈ {0, 1}.
A strategy for bidder i of type k is a strictly increasing, type symmetric
bidding strategy sk : [c, c] → [b, b]. From Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
[2000] it follows that the type k bidder i solves
max
b
Πk(bi; ci, X`, N`) = max
bi
(bi − ci)
∏
j∈nk\{i}
(1− Fk(s−1k (bi)|X`))j
∏
j∈nk′
(1− Fk′(s−1k′ (b)|X`))j
= max
bi
(bi − ci)
∏
j∈nk\{i}
(1− Gk(bi|X`, N`))j
∏
j∈nk′
(1− Gk′(bi|X`, N`))j,
where k 6= k′ ∈ {0, 1} and Gk(b|X`, N`) = Fk(s−1k (b)|X`) is the probability
that bidder j ∈ nk`\{i} will bid less than b, and likewise for k′. The first
order condition for i ∈ nk` is
(bki − cki) = 1
(nk` − 1) gk(bki|X`,N`)1−Gk(bki|X`,N`) + nk′
gk′ (bki|X`,N`)
1−Gk′ (bki|X`,N`)
. (1)
This first order condition with the boundary conditions sk(c) = b, k = 0, 1
uniquely characterizes optimal bidding strategy for all bidders. The model
structure is the type specific conditional distribution of cost {Fk(·|X`)} for
k = 0, 1 given X. But since the data provide information on the character-
istics of the project that is being procured, X` in the `th project, we can con-
sider only the type specific conditional cost distribution Fk(·|X`), k = 0, 1 as
the structural parameter. The question of identification is to ask if there are
two pairs of cost distributions {F0(·|X`), F1(·|X`)} and {F′0(·|X`), F
′
1(·|X`)}
that are observationally equivalent.
Evaluating (1) at the estimated bid distribution and densities, we see that
for each auction `, bid bki uniquely determines the cost
cki = b`ki −
1
(nk` − 1) gk(b
`
ki|X`,N`)
1−Gk(b`ki|X`,N`)
+ nk′`
gk′ (b`ki|X`,N`)
1−Gk′ (b`ki|X`,N`)
, (2)
thereby identifying {F0(·|X`), F1(·|X`)} that is consistent with the data.
2.2. Estimation. In the first step we follow Aryal, Gabrielli, and Vuong
[2015] and estimate the conditional bid distributions Gk(·|X, N) and the bid
7densities gk(·|X, N) given the engineer’s estimate X and the set of bidders
N, using Local Polynomial Estimation (LPE) method. We begin by intro-
ducing the LPE, see Fan and Gijbels [1996] for more.
Consider a bivariate i.i.d. data {Xi, Yi}ni=1. Our interest is the regres-
sion function m(x0) and its derivatives m′(x0), m′′(x0) and so on till mp(x0).
Hence, we regard the model E[Y|X] = m(X). Under the assumption that
(p + 1)th derivative of m(·) exists at x = x0, LPE can approximate m(·) by a
polynomial of order p. Taylor expansion gives
m(x) ≈
p∑
j=0
mj(x0)
(x− x0)j
j!
,
and this polynomial is fitted locally by a weighted least squares regression
that minimizes
n∑
i=1
{Yi −
p∑
j=0
β j(x− x0)j}2Kh(Xi − x0),
where h is the bandwidth, Kh(·) = K
( ·
h
)
/h with K a kernel function. If
βˆ j, j = 0, . . . , p is the solution to the weighted least squares then j!β j(x0) is
the estimator for mj(x0), j = 0, . . . , p. The exact form used for our estima-
tion is given in Appendix (A-1). We make the following assumptions for
estimation.
Assumption A3:
(i) The kernels KG(·), K0g(·) and K1g(·) are symmetric with bounded hyper-
cube supports and twice continuous bounded derivatives with respect to
their arguments,
(ii)
∫
KG(x)dx = 1,
∫
K0g(x)dx = 1,
∫
K1g(b)db = 1
(iii) KG(·), K0g(·) and K1g(·) are of order R− 1. Thus moments of order strictly
smaller than R− 1 vanish.
Assumption A4: The bandwidths hG, h1g and h2g satisfy
(i) hG → 0 and
LhdG
log L
→ ∞, as L→ ∞,
(ii) h0g → 0, h1g → 0 and
Lhd0gh1g
log L
→ ∞, as L→ ∞.
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From this assumption it is clear that it is possible to choose the optimal
bandwidths, i.e. the bandwidths proposed in Stone [1982]. As mentioned in
the introduction, an important advantage of using LPE over Kernel density
estimator as in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] is that LPE is consis-
tent even at the boundary of the support. Kernel density estimators are
inconsistent at the boundaries and require some form of boundary correc-
tion. One widely used method is trimming, for which we need to specify
a “boundary bandwidth,” which requires the knowledge of the location of
the boundaries.2 None of that is necessary for us, because of the LPE.
We have 3 conditioning variables, one that is continuous and two that are
discrete. Thus, we have to adapt the definition of the LPE to the present
case. However, the discrete variables do not affect the asymptotic proper-
ties of the estimator, [see Bierens, 1987; Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000,
footnote 12], so in order to choose the optimal bandwidth the relevant num-
ber of covariates to consider is the number of continuous variables. Similar
observation is made by Abadie and Imbens [2006]. Let p be the number of
continuous variables and d be the total number of conditioning variables.
For our application, d = 3 and p = 1. Let ψˆ = gˆ(·|·, ·)/1 − Gˆ(·|·, ·) be
the estimator of ψ(·|·, ·, ·) = gk(·|·, ·, ·)/1− Gk(·|·, ·, ·). From Proposition 1
in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] we know that Gk(·|·) is R + 1 times
continuously differentiable on its entire support and therefore gk(·|·) is R
times continuously differentiable on its entire support as well.3 Given the
smoothness of each function we propose to use a LPE (R), i.e. a LPE of de-
gree R, for Gk(·|·, ·, ·) and a LPE (R− 1) for gk(·|·, ·, ·). Aryal, Gabrielli, and
Vuong [2015] have shown that the bid distribution is consistent and follow-
ing Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] it is easy to see that the estimated
costs are strongly consistent. The exact econometrics model and the selec-
tion of optimal bandwidths are explained in Appendix A-1.
2 Other correction methods include: the reflection method Cline and Hart [1991]; Schus-
ter [1985]; Silverman [1986], the boundary kernel method Gasser and Mu¨ller [1979]; Gasser,
Mu¨ller, and Mammitzsch [1985]; Jones [1993]; Zhang and Karunamuni [2000].
3 From Proposition 1 by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000], we also know that the
conditional density g0(·|·, ·) is R+ 1 times continuously differentiable on a closed subset of
the interior of the support and thus the degree of smoothness closed to the boundaries and
at the boundaries of the support is not R + 1.
93. COLLUSION PROOF AUCTION
In this section we introduce the C-M auction. We present only the main
(and necessary) result(s) from the paper; anyone interested in formal treat-
ment of the topic should consult C-M. Let there be N < ∞ risk-neutral
bidders in an independent private value, low bid auction. Each bidder
draws i.i.d cost C ∼ F(·).4 Let C represent the partition of players such
that each element of the partition represents a coalition such that every sin-
gleton {i} ∈ C is an independent bidder, and M is a generic element. Here
in the example C = {{1, 2}, {3}}. LetM = {N, F(·),C} be the context of
the game and is commonly known by all bidders. Moreover, we assume that
for every coalition M ∈ C, the |M|− tuple cost profile CM = {Ci : i ∈ M} is
common knowledge only amongst the bidders in that coalition. The seller,
however, only knows {N, F(·)}.
Let {Ai, Pi}Ni=1 be an allocation and pricing rule, where Ai ∈ {0, 1} such
that
∑
i∈N Ai = 1 and Pi is the price paid by bidder i. We assume that all
coalitions are efficient and hence when the ex-post utility of a bidder i is
(Pi − Ci)Ai, the utility of the coalition M is the sum across the members, i.e.
uM =
∑
i∈M(Pi − Ci)Ai. Each member i ∈ M acts to maximize uM(·).
Definition 1. An auction, for a contextM, is directly collusive if the set of pure
strategies for i, si(·) consist of the set of all mapping from C 7→ (C, M).
So, a bidder with cost C reports his cost and the coalition M. Let uM(s)
denote the total utility of coalition M when everyone uses symmetric bid-
ding strategy s(·). Now, we are in a position to define dominant-strategy
truthfulness and coalitional rationality.
Definition 2. An auction is collusively dominant-strategy truthful if, for all coali-
tion M ∈ C and all strategy profiles sM := {si(·) : i ∈ M} and s−M := {sj(·) :
j 6∈ C\{M}}, ∀i ∈ M : uM((Ci, M), s−M) ≥ uM((C′i , M′), s−M). and is coali-
tionally rational if uM((Ci, M), s−M) ≥ 0.
Let s(·) = {(C1, M1), . . . , (CN, MN)} be an action profile. Then a disagree-
ment (in s(·)) is an ordered pair (i, j) such that Mi 3 j but Mj 63 i. In other
4 For notational ease, we treat all bidders to be symmetric, extending it to asymmetric
bidders is straightforward.
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words, we say that (i, j) is disagreement if i claims to be a part of collusion
ring Mi that contains j but j does not reciprocate. Given a profile s(·) the
outcome (A, P) is computed as follows: First, there is the punishing phase
if there is any disagreement, in which case Ai = 0 for all i. Then to deter-
mine the price we start with Pi = 0 and for each disagreement (i, j) charge
Pi = Pi + 2t and Pj = Pj − t, while keeping t with the seller. (Since pun-
ishment is off-the-equilibrium path it does not affect the estimation results.)
Second, when there is no disagreement we initiate the standard phase where
from the reported coalitions the coalition partition C is constructed. Then,
the lowest bidder wins the auction and we determine the winning coalition
M∗ and charge
Pi =
{
0 if AM∗ =
∑
j∈M∗ Aj = 0
C1:(N\M∗) o/w
to every bidder i, where C1:(N\M∗) is the lowest bid from the bidder j 6∈ M.
Theorem 1. C-M: The mechanism outlined above is (a) Collusive dominant-strategy
truthful; (b) Coalitional rational and ; (c) Efficient.
4. DATA
Below we describe our data and the implementation of Bajari and Ye
[2003] tests to determine bidders whose bidding pattern is at odds with
what we would expect under competitive bidding.
Data Source. The data consist of the Highway procurements in the state of
California between January 2002 and January 2008. The rights to maintain
and construct highways and roads are granted through sealed low-bid auc-
tions (procurements) by the California Department of Transportation (Cal-
trans). The data is available from Caltrans official-webpage, and contains
information about the characteristics of the projects, the name of bidders
and their submitted bid.
Timing. First, during the advertising period that can last between three to
ten weeks, depending on the size of the project, the Caltrans Headquarters
Office Engineer announces a project and solicits bids. A project can be: as-
phalt repaving, road paving, bridge reconstruction, striping the highway,
11
constructing, replacing and widening brides, storm damage repair, etc. Po-
tential bidders express their interest by buying the project catalogue – only
those with a catalogue can bid. Second, sealed bids are received only from
among the potential bidders. Third, on the letting day, bids are ranked and
the project is awarded to the lowest bidder, provided that the bidder fulfills
other criteria determined by either the federal or state laws or both.
Bidders and Projects. Bidders can be asymmetric in terms of their frequency
of participation across different projects. This could be because (on average)
some bidders are more efficient ( have lower cost) than the others. We as-
sume that bidders can be divided into two types: the fringe (type k = 0)
bidders and the regular (type k = 1) bidders. So a fringe (main) bidder
is someone who participates less (more) frequently and in smaller (bigger)
projects. There are 823 bidders who bid at least once. Following the liter-
ature, we define regular bidders as bidders who have a nontrivial (at least
1%) revenue share in the market and participate frequently (at least 3%).
Twenty-one bidders satisfy this criteria and will henceforth be called the
type 1 bidders while the remaining are type 0.
There are in total 2,152 unique projects awarded by Caltrans, for a total
of $7.645 billions, but some auctions have only one bidder. Once we drop
those single bidder auctions we are left with 1,907 projects. For every project
we know the county of the site of job, and because we know bidders’ main
offices we can calculate the distance (in miles) from the main office to the
project site. To construct the distance we use the longitudinal and latitudinal
coordinates of the county of site and the corresponding coordinates for the
zip code of the main office. We expect the distance to have some effect on
the bids through the cost because, all else equal, it is cheaper to work on
projects that are closer to the main office than further so bidders located
closer to the site bid low. The correlation between bids and distance is 0.012,
which suggests that there are other, more important, factors affecting bids.
One such factor is the backlog, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003], which
is defined as the sum of the dollar values of Caltrans projects won but not
yet completed by the bidder. Given a backlog, bidders are assumed to work
at a constant rate on each of the projects won. But the effect of backlog
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on (future) bids depends on the total capacity of the bidder, which we de-
fine as the maximum backlog carried by a bidder during the sample period.
In other words, following Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003], we can use
utilization rate defined as the backlog to capacity ratio for each bidder to
determine the effect on bids at every auction; see Table A-1.
Bidding Ring. Since our objective is to identify bidders who could be col-
luding, we need to probe further. We hypothesize that larger projects are
more vulnerable to collusive attacks than smaller projects. We note that
auctions that are large, valued between $ 1 million and $20 millions attract
fewer bidders and most of them tend to be the main bidders. From now on,
we focus only on such auctions, and there are a total of 724 projects which
total to $2.408 billions (31% of the total), with 413 bidders out of which 202
win at least once. From the summary statistics in Table A-1 we can conclude
that: (i) on an average there are slightly more than four bidders; (ii) average
winning bid is $3.33 millions, which is less than the average engineers’ esti-
mate of $3.77 millions; (iii) the average bid is $3.79 millions; (iv) money on
the table – the difference between the highest and the second highest bid –
is on average $0.3 million suggesting informational asymmetry among bid-
ders; (v) the distance between the bidder’s office and the project site has
minimal effect on bids; (vi) on average projects take slightly more than 6
months to be completed; (vii) fringe (type 0) bidders win on average smaller
protects than main (type 1) bidders; (viii) on average there are more type 0
bidders participating than type 1 bidders; (ix) the two types differ in their
backlogs, and utilization rate which for type0 is double than for type 1.
Moving forward, our working hypothesis is that if there is any bidder
who makes a case for a colluder (we define the criteria shortly below) then
it must be a type 1 bidder. In Table A-2 we present the descriptive statistics
for type 1 bidders who are named A, B, C, etc. (column (i)). To get a sense
of market power, we compare the actual number of wins (column (ii)) for
each bidder with the bidder’s “expected number of wins,” (column (iii)) so
bidders with consistently higher actual win than the expected wins will be
said to have higher market power. Consider bidder A, who bids on a total
of 50 projects, (n` − 1) bidders in `th auction, the expected number of wins
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is then defined to be
∑50
`=1 1/n`. With the exception of five bidders (A, C,
I, L and U), all bidders win more contracts than expected. Column (v) re-
ports the average bid (in millions of $) of each bidder across all participated
auction, column (vi) reports the revenue share, which is equal to the total
value of the bidder’s winning bid as a fraction of the total value of winning
bids for all projects; and column (vii) reports the the participation (or bid
frequency) rate. Bidder D stands out, with participation rate of 0.44.
Next, we follow Bajari and Ye [2003] to detect bidders whose bidding
pattern systemically violate exchangeability and independent bidding, both
of which are implied by competitive bidding. To increase the likelihood of
picking a coalition we give more emphasis to bidders who participate in the
same auction because the literature on collusion suggests that ring members
tend to participate in the same auctions to enforce the bidding agreement;
see Marshall and Marx [2012]. Like Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] we consider
all combinations of pairs and select those bidders that have at least fifteen
simultaneous bids. We want as many simultaneous bidding as possible to
be very strict on whom we choose as colluders, but in view of the data, we
stop at fifteen because beyond that we do not have enough observations
left for the test. See Table A-3. There are fourteen pairs involving fourteen
bidders who bid frequently together.
To test independence we consider the fourteen pairs of bidders bidding
frequently and estimate the following models for fourteen type 1 bidders
and the remaining bidders, respectively,
BIDi`/EE` = γ0 + γ1LDISTi` + γ2CAPi` + γ3UTILi` + γ4LMDISTi` + ui` (3)
BIDi`/EE` = α0 + α1LDISTi` + α2CAPi` + α3UTILi` + α4LMDISTi` + ςi`. (4)
Here LDISTi` is the logarithm of distance, LMDISTi` is the logarithm of the
distance of bidder i′s closest competitor, in the project `, and UTILi` is the
utilization rate of the capacity.
We estimate (3) with bidder specific coefficients for the bidders who par-
ticipate frequently and simultaneously and are listed in Table A-3, and for
the rest we use (4). For the estimation, we pool both the equations and in-
clude project fixed effects. In total, we estimate 16 different models, where
each model includes 723 project dummies and 13 bidder dummies, besides
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the afore mentioned regressors.5 We calculate the correlation between esti-
mated residuals for every pair {i, j}, i.e., ρij = corr(uˆi`, uˆj`), from the four-
teen type 1 bidders, and use the Pearson’s correlation test for (conditional)
independence. Results are presented in Table A-4. We find that except for
bidders D and T, we reject the null hypothesis of independence at 5% level.
Next, we test exchangeability among bidders, i.e.,
H0 : (∀i, j, i 6= j), (∀s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) γis = γjs,
HA : (∃i, j, i 6= j), (∃s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) γis 6= γjs,
at both market level by pooling the fourteen bidders in one group and on
a pairwise basis (i.e considering that all fourteen bidders are potential col-
luders). That is, we conduct two exercises. In the first one we test if a cartel
formed by the 14 candidates fails the exchangeability test. Second we con-
duct the test on a pairwise basis, taking into account all the pairs with at
least fifteen simultaneous bids.
Let T = 3, 347 be the number of observations, m the number of regressors
and k the number of constraints implied by H0. Then under the null the test
statistic
F =
(SSRC − SSRU)/r
SSRU/(T −m) ⇒
d F(r, T −m).
At the market level, exchangeability hypothesis imposes that the effect of
the four explanatory variables is the same for both potential ring (“the big
cartel with 14 bidders”) members and the remaining bidders. Since there
are thirteen dummies (indexing the bidders) and for each case there are four
restrictions (under the null), the total number of restrictions imposed under
the null is r = 52. Here m = 747 and T − m = 2600 and the estimated F−
statistic is 6.2019 with the upper tail area equal to 0. Therefore we reject
the null of exchangeability when comparing the fourteen bidders (potential
cartel members) against the remaining bidders.
For our exercise to be meaningful, it must be the case that there is no other
collusive strategy being used to sustain collusion. In particular, we have
implicitly ruled out the possibility that bidders use bid-rotations to sustain
5 Presenting all the results would require considerable space, and hence we do not
present the results, but they are available to the reader upon request.
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collusion. Even though a definitive proof that there is no bid rotation is
hard to come by, under the assumption that all 14 bidders are members of
one ring, we determined all auctions where at least one of these 14 bidders
were present. Then for all such auction we visually verified that there is no
obvious and discernible pattern in participation. In Figure 1, on the x-axis
we have the date for the auction and on the y-axis we put the bidders. Each
color corresponds to one unique bidder. And as can be verified there is at
least no (visual) evidence of any rotating pattern. This won’t work if bidders
use some other cunning ways (sun-spot) to coordinate, like in Asker [2008].
It is also known that sustaining large cartel is difficult. We view 14 as
being a large cartel. So, to get a tighter number, we impose further con-
ditions that bids must satisfy to be termed as collusive bids, and hope to
reduce the size of the ring. We performed the pairwise tests by pooling bid-
ders accordingly and find that the hypothesis of exchangeability is rejected
at conventional levels for 12 out of 14 pairs including the pair (D,M), (A,D)
and (D,E). See Table A-5 for details.6 Comparing the “expected win” with
the actual win for these pairs, we do see that at least one member of the
pair wins often. Comparing Table A-2 and Table A-3 we can conclude that:
(i) firm A exclusively bids against firm D; (ii) firm E bids remarkably fre-
quently with both firm A and firm D; (iii) the pairs (D,M) and (A,D) have
the highest number of simultaneous bids. All of these suggest that bidders
(A,D,E, M) could be considered as potential collusive ring. Based on the
previous analysis all pairs of bidders considered do not pass at least one of
the tests for competitive bidding. However, taking into account the num-
ber of simultaneous bids, bidders D and M bid simultaneously more often
than others. And since the triplet (A,D,E) also fit the collusive behavior, we
consider colluding bidders to be (A, D, E, M) in our second exercise.
Summary. Using the methods in Bajari and Ye [2003] we tested if bids by
type 1 bidders across auctions satisfied independence and exchangeability
or not. We found that 14 bidders fail at least one the two criteria. In the coun-
terfactual exercise, we shall treat them as the members of one bidding ring.
6 Ideally we would have liked to conduct the tests for every subsets of these fifteen
bidders not just the pairs, but we have insufficient data to analyze each subset.
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The cost thus estimated will provide a (worst-case) upper bound. Recogniz-
ing that the difficulty of sustaining collusion increases with the (potential)
members, we sought to impose further restrictions on bidding pattern in a
hope to minimize the size. At the end we conclude that the smallest col-
lusive ring would have 4 bidders (they do not have to be members of one
cartel, but if they are then it again provides an upper bound on the counter-
factual cost). In contrast, if we were using a data where it was known that
bidders colluded and the identity of the bidders were known, this exercise
would have not have been necessary.
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here, we take the estimates of the pseudo cost recovered earlier, along
with the set of “colluders” (these are those who fail Bajari and Ye [2003] tests
and frequently bid in pairs) from above and implement the CM-auction.
We ask, how much extra would it cost for Caltrans to procure the same
projects using the new auction. Since we have cost for each bid, we can
easily compute the change in cost.
Let W` be the set of colluders who are present in auction ` and let i` ∈ N`
be the winner and b˜` the corresponding bid. Let o` be the smallest cost
amongst all bidders participating in auction ` who belong to the coalition
W` except for the winner, ie. o` is the CM-price. That is if the winner belongs
to the coalition, i.e. i` ∈W`, then o` = minj 6=i∈n`∩{W`\i`} Cˆj and if the winner
is not a member of the coalition then we can set o` = c˜`, the real winning
cost. Then the difference between CM-auction and the data is r` = o` − c˜`
if the winner is a cartel member and r` = 0 otherwise. Once we compute
the change in cost r` for all auctions the total change in cost of procuring is
just
∑
` r`. For the first case the total set of colluders is the 14 bidders and
W` = W ∩ n1`, while for the second case W` = n1` ∩ {A, D, E, M}.
When we consider the bidding ring with 14 members, we find that the
cost increases by 5%, and it provides the upper bound on the change in
cost because larger the coalition larger will be the mark-up. Likewise when
we consider the bidding ring with only 4 members, we find that the cost
increases by 1.6%, which can be considered as the lower bound. For any
other ring sizes the induced increase in cost will be in the range [1.6%, 5%].
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This exercise, however, ignores the fact that these expenses are covered
through (distortionary) taxes. So we have to augment the cost by adding
the marginal excess burden (MEB) per additional dollar of tax revenue. An
estimate of MEB is hard to come by, but one of the most reliable estimate
is by Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley [1985], and they find it to be 0.3. In
other words, each dollar raised through taxes leads to a distortion of 30%.
Therefore, the total cost of implementing C-M is between 2.08% to 6.5%.
Discussion. The natural question is if this cost is big. Although this is very
hard to tell, we believe that this is not a huge cost, especially when factor in
that in reality we don’t even know how much we lose if bidders are collud-
ing and nothing is done. In some sense, this extra cost is the price of collu-
sion. The real cost of implementing this auction is not the dollar amount but
the fact that to run this auction successfully the auctioneer (in particular the
public sector that runs the auction) must be willing not to prosecute the col-
luders. From the legal point of view this requires extensions of the Leniency
Program run by the antitrust division of department of Justice. We have
nothing to contribute to that strand of literature, but our hope is to make
a case that faced with the challenge we out to think outside of the box and
explore other options beyond just seeking criminal charges. This is also an
example where economics and jurisprudence are both equally important.
One caveat of C-M auction is that it is a static auction and thus ignores any
dynamic incentives.7 Could it be possible that running C-M auction repeat-
edly will encourage not discourage collusion? C-M auction, however, need
not even work in a dynamic bidding environment. We hope to draw the at-
tention of researchers in this area to this lacuna problem in bridging the gap
between theoretical mechanism design and its empirical application. In the
future, there is a possibility to address this problem by combining the in-
sights from Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003] (dynamic auctions) and Che
and Kim [2009] (collusion-proof auction with endogenous entry).
7 See Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic [2006] for the effect of leniency program on cartels.
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APPENDIX
A-1. ESTIMATION
In this section we outline the estimation problem and discuss the choice
of bandwidths and kernels. To account for the skewness in the bid distri-
bution, a widely observed problem encountered with auction data, we use
logarithmic transformation. For notational simplicity we suppress the de-
pendance of the distributions on (X, N), unless otherwise noted. Log trans-
formation of (2) gives
ckM = ξk(dk, n) = edk − e
dk
(nk − 1) gkd(dk|·,·)1−Gkd(dk|·,·) + n1
g1d(dk|·,·)
1−G1d(dk|·,·)
(5)
where dk = ln(bk) and Gkd(·|·, ·), gkd(·|·, ·) are the distribution and density
of log(bk) for type k. Define KH(u) = |H|−1K(H−1u), where H is a non-
singular d × d matrix, the bandwidth matrix that usually takes the form
H = hId and |B| denotes its determinant. The observations are given by
{(ZTi , Yi) : i = 1, . . . , n}with Zi = (Xi, N0i, N1i)T. Let (x, n0, n1) be a point in
R3. The estimators involved are, as mentioned above Local Polynomial Esti-
mators. For our application, R = 2 and therefore we implement a LPE(2) for
each cdf involved and a LPE (1) for each pdf involved. Let YGp` = 1I(Bpl ≤ b).
Using a local quadratic approximation to estimate each cdf implies obtain-
ing the solution to the following least squares minimization problem
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
YGp` −
[
β0 + β1(Xp` − x) + β2(N1` − n1) + β3(N0` − n0)
+β11(Xp` − x)2 + β12(Xp` − x)(N1` − n1) + β13(Xp` − x)(N0` − n0)
+β23(N0` − n0)(N1` − n1) + β22(N1` − n1)2 + β33(N0` − n0)2
]}2
KH (Z− z)
with respect to βG = (β0, β1, β2, β3, β11, β12, β13, β23, β22, β33). In particular
we are interested in β0 = G(b|x, n0, n1). Then, we know from the least
squares theory that βˆG = (ZTGWGZG)
−1ZTGTGY, where the design matrix ZG
for the local quadratic case (what we use) is
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ZG =

1 (X1,1 − x) (N0,1 − n0) (N1,1 − n1) (X1,1 − x)2 (X1,1 − x)(N0,1 − n0)
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 (X1,ni − x) (N0,ni − n0) (N1,ni − n1) (X1,ni − x)2 (X1,ni − x)(N0,ni − n0)
(X1,1 − x)(N1,1 − n1) (N0,1 − n0)(N1,1 − n1) (N0,1 − n0)2 (N1,1 − n1)2
...
...
...
...
(X1,ni − x)(N1,ni − n1) (N0,ni − n0)(N1,ni − n1) (N0,ni − n0)2 (N1,ni − n1)2

For the densities involved define Ygp` =
1
h2g
K2g
(
Bp`−b
h2g
)
. We use a local
linear estimator, i.e. LPE(1) which, as before, is obtained as the solution to
the following least squares problem
L∑
{`:I`=i}
i∑
p=1
{
Ygp` − β0 + β1(Xp` − x) + β2(N1` − n1) + β3(N0` − n0)
}2
KH (Z− z)
It is well known that βˆg = (ZTTgZ)−1ZTTgY. The design matrix Z for the
local linear case is
Z =

1 (X1,1 − x) (N0,1 − n0) (N1,1 − n1)
...
...
...
...
1 (X1,ni − x) (N0,ni − n0) (N1,ni − x)
 .
The corresponding weighting matrix for each estimation procedure are TG =
diag{KH(Zi − z)} and Tg = diag{KH(Zi − z)}, respectively. The band-
widths and kernels involved for distributions and densities are different.
Choices of Kernels and Bandwidths. Since the exact choice of the Kernels
is not crucial for inference, we use product of univariate kernels to represent
the multivariate kernel, i.e.
Km
(
a− Ak
hg
,
b− Bk
hg
,
n− Nk
hgn
)
= Ka
(
a− Ak
hg
)
Kb
(
b− Bk
hg
)
Kn
(
n− Nk
hgn
)
.
Here, Km(·, ·, ·) is the multivariate Kernel, Ka(·) and Kb(·) denote the uni-
variate Kernels corresponding to the continuous variables A and B, respec-
tively, and Kn(·) is the kernel for the discrete variables such that Kn(·) :=
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Kn0(·) · Kn1(·) · Kn2(·). The kernels for continuous variables should be sym-
metric with bounded supports, so we decided to use the Epanechnikov Ker-
nel function K(u) = 3/4(1− u2)1I(|u| ≤ 1), as it is an optimal Kernel in the
sense that it minimizes the asymptotic mean squared error over all non-
negative functions Fan, Gasser, Gijbels, Brockmann, and Engel [1993]. For
the discrete variables, we use Gaussian Kernel because, as there is less vari-
ation in the number of bidders it is desirable to give less weight to obser-
vations farther from the point at which estimation takes place and is best
achieved with a kernel with unbounded support.8 We assume the smooth-
ness parameter R = 2 for the cost distribution. To ensure uniform consis-
tency at the optimal rates, the bandwidths for the continuous variables are
chosen to be hg = 1.06× 2.214× σˆ× (T)−1/(2R+1), hG = 1.06× 2.214× σˆ×
(T)−1/(2R+3). The constant term comes from the so–called rule of thumb
and the factor 2.214 is the one corresponding to the use of Epanechnikov
Kernels instead of Gaussian Kernels; see Ha¨rdle [1991].
A-2. TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE A-1. Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
All Type 0 Type 1 All Type 0 Type 1 All Type 0 Type 1 All Type 0 Type 1 All Type 0 Type 1
# Bidders 724 413 311 4.62 4.97 4.16 2.37 2.55 2.01 2 2 2 23 23 13
Winning bid 724 413 311 3.33 2.82 4.00 3.11 2.74 3.42 0.43 0.43 0.52 19.88 19.19 19.88
Money 724 413 311 0.30 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.39 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.52 3.72 4.52
Eng. Est. 724 413 311 3.77 3.23 4.48 3.49 3.12 3.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 19.96 19.96 19.72
All bids 3347 2274 1073 3.79 3.57 4.24 3.51 3.40 3.69 0.43 0.43 0.52 24.01 24.01 23.11
Backlog 3347 2274 1073 4.30 0.85 11.60 9.76 2.42 14.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 61.80 26.53 61.80
Distance 3347 2274 1073 123.98 119 134 162.93 175 134 1.32 1 3 1578.85 1579 897
Capacity 413 392 21 2.30 1.41 18.88 5.69 3.50 11.11 0 0 7.23 61.80 26.53 61.80
Utilization 3347 2274 1073 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0 0 0 1 1 1
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for both types. Winning bids is the lowest bid
at which the auction is awarded. Money, stands for money-on-the-table and is equal to the
different between second lowest bid and the lowest bid. Eng. Est. stands for the engineer’s
estimate of the level of expenditure. Utilit = Backlogit/Capi (if Capi = 0, then Utilit = 0 for
all t)
8There are no theoretical restrictions to the kernels applied to discrete variables.
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TABLE A-2. Type 1 Bidders
Bidder # of # of Exp. # Avg. bid Revenue Participation
ID Bids wins of wins (in ml. $) Share rate
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
A 50 9 10.34 4.83 0.02 0.07
B 34 13 10.51 3.21 0.01 0.05
C 43 9 10.46 5.32 0.01 0.06
D 319 97 87.32 3.61 0.14 0.44
E 46 11 10.15 4.49 0.02 0.06
F 42 15 10.70 3.63 0.02 0.06
G 25 12 5.84 4.09 0.03 0.03
H 26 6 5.16 5.03 0.01 0.04
I 34 4 6.90 8.44 0.02 0.05
J 35 16 7.95 4.32 0.02 0.05
K 29 13 6.94 3.69 0.02 0.04
L 31 5 6.82 6.37 0.01 0.04
M 50 16 12.95 4.03 0.03 0.07
N 33 9 6.31 3.35 0.02 0.05
O 28 10 8.10 3.48 0.01 0.04
P 47 12 8.82 4.37 0.02 0.06
Q 25 13 5.99 3.75 0.02 0.03
R 68 16 15.22 4.77 0.03 0.09
S 26 7 4.78 5.75 0.03 0.04
T 41 11 7.18 2.92 0.02 0.06
U 41 7 10.27 4.50 0.02 0.06
Total 1073 311 259 0.52
Notes: Type 1 are the bidders with revenue shares of at least 1% and participation rate of at
least 3%. Column: (i) is the bidder identity; (ii) is the number of (total) bids across all auctions;
(iii) is the actual number of wins; (iv) is the expected number of wins; (v) the average bid (in
million $) across all auctions; (vi) is the revenue share defined as the ratio of the sum of all
winning bids by the bidder to the total of all winning bids; and (vii) is the participation rate
is the fraction of the time the bidder participates.
TABLE A-3. Summary of Simultaneous Bids
Pairs # of Smlt. Exp. # of First Second
Bids Wins Wins Wins
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
(A,D) 44 9.03 9 5
(A,E) 20 4.05 3 6
(B,D) 29 9.51 12 10
(C,D) 17 5.65 5 9
(D,E) 41 8.67 8 9
(D,F) 26 7.46 5 9
(D,H) 19 3.92 7 3
(D,L) 25 5.16 7 5
(D,M) 44 11.08 13 14
(D,O) 27 7.96 10 10
(D,S) 22 4.20 5 6
(D,T) 19 2.97 2 3
(K,U) 22 4.91 11 2
(T,U) 15 2.81 5 2
Notes: Summary of simultaneous bids. Column: (i) is the pair of bidders; (ii) is the number
of simultaneous bids, i.e, the number of auctions where the pair from column (i) participate;
(iii) is the expected number of wins; (iv) is the number of auctions where the first bidder in
the pair wins; (v) is the number of auctions where the second bidder from the pair wins.
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TABLE A-4. Conditional Independence Test
Pairs F- Stat p-value n d.o.f
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
(A,D) 0.7660 0.0000 44 42
(A,E) 0.7427 0.0002 20 18
(B,D) 0.7331 0.0000 29 27
(C,D) 0.9239 0.0000 17 15
(D,E) 0.6530 0.0000 41 39
(D,F) 0.7570 0.0000 26 24
(D,H) 0.4734 0.0406 19 17
(D,L) 0.7643 0.0000 25 23
(D,M) 0.8538 0.0000 44 42
(D,O) 0.8555 0.0000 27 25
(D,S) 0.6877 0.0004 22 20
(D,T) 0.4305 0.0658 19 17
(K,U) 0.6529 0.0010 22 20
(T,U) 0.6271 0.0123 15 13
Notes: This table provides result from conditional independent test for each pair. Column:
(i) identifies the pair; (ii) is the F-statistic; (iii) is the corresponding p-value; (iv) is the number
of observation used in the test; (v) is the degrees of freedom.
TABLE A-5. Exchangeability Test on Pairwise Basis
Pairs F -stat UTA
(i) (ii) (iii)
(A,D) 5.1926 0.0000
(A,E) 2.3506 0.0162
(B,D) 5.9269 0.0000
(C,D) 8.4150 0.0000
(D,E) 7.9435 0.0000
(D,F) 6.8343 0.0000
(D,H) 5.1926 0.0000
(D,L) 5.5009 0.0000
(D,M) 7.1579 0.0000
(D,O) 6.1059 0.0000
(D,S) 3.7330 0.0002
(D,T) 4.6150 0.0000
(K,U) 0.7972 0.6050
(T,U) 0.3504 0.9460
Notes: This table provides result from exchangeability test for each pair. Column: (i) identi-
fies the pair; (ii) is the F-statistic; (iii) is the upper tail area (UTA).
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FIGURE 1. No Bid Rotation
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Notes: This figure shows that there is no bid rotation pattern in the data. On the X-axis is
the date of all auctions where at least one of type 1 bidder is present. Each such bidder is
the given a unique identifier, and a unique color for visual aid. Consider the first auction on
16-04-2002 where only bidder B4 participates. The next auction is on 19-06-2002 where B4
and another bidder B164 participates, and so on.
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